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Abstract 
Initiatives in electronic conveyancing and registration show the potential of new 
technologies to transform such systems, reducing costs and enhancing legal security. However, 
they also incur substantial risks of transferring costs and risks among registries, conveyancers 
and rightholders, instead of reducing them; entrenching the private interests of conveyancers, 
instead of increasing competition and disintermediating them; modifying the allocation of tasks 
in a way that leads in the long term to the debasement of registries of rights with indefeasible 
title into mere recordings of deeds; and empowering conveyancers instead of transactors and 
rightholders, which increases costs and reduces security. Fulfilling the promise of new 
technologies in both costs and security requires strengthening registries’ incentives and 
empowering rightholders in their interaction with registries. 
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1. Introduction 
Electronic automation has made possible new ways of contracting, registering and settling 
transactions. In essence, technology has enabled the automation of many tasks performed by 
conveyancers when preparing and authenticating contracts and communicating with each other and 
with the registries. Many registries’ tasks have also been automated, including not only 
communication and archiving but also some routine compliance checks. 
The least problematic changes are the use of information technologies for archiving and 
accessing information, by keeping the register in digital form and providing online access to the 
elements of the register that are open to conveyancers, parties or the general public. A second step is 
to make it possible for users and/or professionals to lodge documents at the registry electronically. In 
principle, these documents could be the digital version of those in the paper system. However, to 
fully exploit the potential of the new technologies, electronic lodgment is often accompanied by 
substantial standardization of documents and transactions. To this effect, the structure of the 
transactions has to be carefully examined and forms preapproved by the registry.
1 For these 
standardized transactions, parties themselves or their legal representatives complete the forms in 
an electronic workspace by entering the specific data on the transaction they want to contract and 
register (e.g., the identity of the buyer or mortgagee, the name and incorporators of a new 
company), often “pre-populating” them with data from registry’s databases that identify each 
property and its owner or identify each company in subsequent filings. If necessary, documents 
in the workspace can be electronically shared by parties and their representatives for review, 
amendment and approval, which is useful in conveyancing. After all parties have granted their 
consent, the document is submitted electronically for registration. The most ambitious systems 
also provide for transferring funds between parties.  
                                                 
1 See, for instance, a list of the 221 electronic forms available at the New Zealand land registry at 
http://www.landonline.govt.nz/edealing/elodgement/e-capable-instruments.asp (visited July 27, 
2009).    3
The most problematic issues relate to: (1) who is allowed to lodge documents at the registry; 
(2) the nature of the review performed by the registry staff before registration; and, 
encompassing both of these aspects, (3) how the new system ensures that rightholders have 
granted their consent.  
First, to speed up reform, reduce opposition to reform and, allegedly but doubtfully, enhance 
security, the new system may reserve access to professional conveyancers, by granting them 
exclusive lodgment access to the registry. For example, in New Zealand, Singapore and British 
Columbia, only conveyancers may lodge documents electronically. Alternatively, the system 
may be open to other participants, at least to those who register for that purpose. This is the case 
of Ontario and the English 2002 Land Registration Act which allows “do it yourself 
conveyancing”.  
Second, lodged documents may be subject to a variable mix of automatic and human pre-
registration checks for compliance. Most systems have instituted electronic lodgment but retain 
manual review by registrars before registration. The idea of allowing conveyancers not only to 
lodge their instruments electronically but also to alter the register after automatic controls by an 
“electronic registrar” but without manual intervention by the registry staff (often called “agency 
registration”) is generally rejected or only applied to simple transactions. Thus, the pioneer 
Electronic Land Registration System in Ontario maintains ultimate control by registrars, and the 
same solution has been adopted in British Columbia and Singapore (Low, 2005). The system 
under development in England also introduces validation by the registry prior to execution and 
completion. The New Zealand Landonline system is exceptional in that conveyancers directly 
alter the register subject only to automatic checks for some impediments to registration, such as 
caveats and pending dealings, with no manual intervention by registry staff prior to registration.
2 
Thus, it provides the paradigm case of agency registration. 
Third, reforms introducing electronic conveyancing differ in how they ensure that 
rightholders have granted their consent to the transaction. Expediency has led some reformers 
                                                 
2 See Christensen (2004) and Low (2005) for summaries of these and other systems.   4
not only to allow but to actually require conveyancers to sign the documents electronically on 
behalf of their clients; clients sign only the authorization documents to be kept by conveyancers. 
(Interestingly, in some countries conveyancers were happy to sign on behalf of their clients 
while in others they were opposed to bearing the risks of such representation. A major factor 
here seems to be previous practice, as both solutions are in place in paper-based systems.
3) 
Alternatively, the system may require the digital signature of rightholders on any document, 
lodged, which is safer. This may allow parties to dispense with witnesses, including 
conveyancers, for authenticating purposes. Security may also be enhanced by having the system 
notify rightholders and even request their consent before registering any relevant alteration in 
their rights. 
The rest of the paper examines in more detail some systems of electronic conveyancing and 
registration at different stages of development with a view to obtaining guidance on these issues. 
It focuses especially on the New Zealand experience which, as a lone example of agency 
registration, is an exception to the general policy of retaining manual control of registration.  
2. Functioning systems in Ontario and New Zealand  
Ontario was one of the first jurisdictions worldwide to provide for electronic registration 
through the Electronic Land Registration System, based on a register of rights (the “Land Titles” 
system), which was created by converting the old record of deeds.  
                                                 
3 In some common law countries (including New Zealand, British Columbia and Ontario, 
according to Low, 2005), it had been customary for conveyancers to sign title documents on 
behalf of their clients. Similarly, in Spain and some other civil law countries, parties sign the 
deed but notaries retain the original deed and lodge a copy at the registry. In all these 
jurisdictions, conveyancers had in fact been signing the documents to be registered. Conversely, 
in England the 2002 Land Registration Act allowed conveyancers to start signing as agents on 
behalf of their clients but professionals were reluctant to take on this function for fear of fraud 
and misunderstandings (Land Registry, 2003, pp. 11, 147-48).   5
This electronic registry is characterized by open lodgment, manual review, deferred 
indefeasibility and the planned empowerment of registries to notify rightholders. 
Lodgment is open to all participants, so non-lawyers may lodge documents that do not 
require a “compliance with law statement”.
4 The procedures set up to grant lodgment access 
simply require applicants to provide evidence of: their identity, to ensure that access is limited to 
persons who are correctly entitled; the sufficiency of their financial resources to pay any 
potential fraud victims; and their good character and accountability, to ensure that those dealing 
with the registration system have appropriate qualifications and integrity (OMGCS, 2008).  
After lodgment, the registry staff manually review documents for compliance before 
registering or rejecting them.
5 Section 23 of the Ontario Land Registration Reform Act stipulates 
that “an electronic document delivered to the electronic land registration database by direct 
electronic transmission is not registered until the land registrar registers the document in the 
prescribed manner.” 
The main legal attribute of a register of rights—i.e., indefeasibility, the application of a 
contract rule in favor of third parties—has been retained. However, the legal effects of 
registration have been diluted to the extent that the law has been moved from immediate to 
deferred indefeasibility by modifying Section 78 of the Land Titles Act 1990, an amendment 
which reinstated what was long believed to be the rule in Ontario prior to the court decision in 
the CIBC Mortgages v Chan case (O’Connor, 2009, pp. 210-14).  
Finally, it is significant that the law considers empowering the registrar to notify rightholders 
of any attempt to register an electronic document that purports to effect a transfer or charge of 
land (Subsection 23(4) of the Land Registration Reform Act, which has not yet been enacted at 
the time of writing).  
                                                 
4 See Low (2005).  
5 See, for detailed information, “Electronic Land Registration” 
(http://www.ontario.ca/en/information_bundle/land_registration/content/stel02_165314, visited 
August 21, 2009).   6
While the Ontario system retained manual review, the New Zealand “Landonline” electronic 
registration system, created in 2002, largely replaced preregistration checks performed by staff 
with automatic checks.
6 If a document passes these, it is registered “almost instantaneously and 
title details are updated automatically without any intervention from registry staff” (Muir, 2003, 
p. 313). Staff also perform some checks and audits after registration but by then it is too late to 
change anything as the registrar’s powers of correction are limited where property rights might 
be affected.  
This reliance on automatic checks has been interpreted as meaning that lawyers are permitted 
to alter the content of the register without involvement from any third party: “conveyancers now 
become de facto Registrar-Generals of Land or guardians of the integrity of title by taking on 
much more overt responsibility in the certification process” (Greenwood and Jones, 2003, p. 
330). The integrity of the Register rests fully on the certifications that Section 164A of New 
Zealand’s Land Transfer Act 1952 requires conveyancers to provide, showing: (1) that the 
parties have authorized the transactions and have proper capacity; (2) that suitable steps have 
been taken to confirm the parties’ identity; (3) that any statutory provisions have been complied 
with or do not apply; and (4) that the supporting documents for the transaction have been 
retained. Before the introduction of the Landonline system, lodged documents were accompanied 
by supporting evidence, such as parties’ authorizations, which allowed the registry staff to check 
their legality before deciding to register the transaction. With the new system, conveyancers 
simply certify this legality and retain supporting documents, which might be audited ex post by 
the registry. Conveyancers were also reluctant to alter the register directly, without manual 
review by the registry staff. The reform transferred to them responsibilities and risks previously 
                                                 
6 The new system is extensively discussed in Grinlinton (2003). For descriptions, see Muir 
(2003) and Greenwood and Jones (2003). Electronic registration was launched by the Land 
Transfer (Computer Registers and Electronic Lodgement) Amendment Act 2002; electronic 
lodgment became mandatory on 23 February 2009, some public counters were closed and the 
remainder provide limited services (LINZ, 2009a). In March 2009, 92.0% of all lodgments were 
electronic (LINZ, 2009b, Table 3).   7
borne by the registry, and this caused a low rate of voluntary up-take of electronic conveyancing 
(O’Connor, 2006, p. 3). 
The effects of the reform are still controversial, raising two main issues: incidence of errors 
and risk of lawyers’ fraud. On the one hand, it was claimed that the system not only did not 
reduce security but could actually enhance it due to the greater involvement of lawyers and their 
certification role, the automatic checks and audits put in place by the registry and the removal of 
duplicate titles (Muir, 2003, pp. 317-18; Greenwood and Jones, 2003, pp. 340-41). However, the 
reform also raised fears that mistaken registrations would increase, given that between 8 and 20 
percent of lodgments contained errors before electronic registration (Grinlinton, 2003, p. 218, n. 
7). This led this author to advise that the registry should exercise greater powers of correction (p. 
344). There were also worries about an increase in opportunistic fraud, with more serious 
consequences for the security of property rights: if dishonest lawyers transfer land to innocent 
parties, prior owners lose their titles (Thomas, 2003a), given that, in spite of the lack of 
independent review, the legal consequences of registration remained those of a Torrens registry, 
protecting in rem innocent third party acquirers.
7 It is likely that a high incidence of errors and 
fraud would trigger a backlash against Torrens, at least with respect to maintaining 
indefeasibility of title.  
The system is still too new for these possible effects to be fully assessed. Lenders answering 
a survey by the New Zealand Law Commission (NZLC, 2008) claimed that both simple and 
serious errors had increased, including errors in relation to priorities, omitted mortgages and 
estates. These are errors that in the past the registry staff would have identified and avoided 
before registration. After the reform, they require reworking a posteriori. The legal profession, 
however, answered that errors had not increased. In fact, the rejection rate for electronic 
lodgments was relatively high, about 16 percent, in 2009, within the pre-reform range reported 
above. This number is hard to evaluate, however, given the move from manual to automatic 
                                                 
7 The New Zealand registry indeed offers immediate indefeasibility diluted by a set of judicial 
interpretation that tend to treat knowledge of opposing interests as fraud (Mason, 2003; 
Blanchard, 2003).    8
checks. Furthermore, it refers to an interim period after more complex instruments started to be 
lodged electronically, so it might be a transition spike.
8  
As to fraud, lenders who responded to the Law Commission survey asserted that the risk of 
wrongful activity had been reduced by removing the duplicate certificate of title and granting 
access to the register only to authorized conveyancers. However, new possibilities of fraud were 
soon demonstrated by cases in which transactions were registered before being completed (e.g., 
McBeath, 2003), and confirmed by cases of mortgage fraud using false identities (MacLennan, 
2005), prompting proposals to strengthen security by requiring rightholders’ consent before 
registration (MacLennan, 2006). Moreover, some uncertainty remains about the level of 
settlements reached by the government for fraudulent and incompetent dealings. 
Overall, the effects are hard to evaluate because of lack of data and the short time lapsed. 
Most of the commentators may be partly right but they may be referring to different samples of 
transactions. They may also be weighing incidences of error and fraud differently. For instance, 
in many registration systems registrars have poor incentives when reviewing transactions for 
registration, which often leads to costly delays (the case in New Zealand before the reforms) and 
may end up in excessively lax control. In such a context, a reform that enhances conveyancers’ 
responsibilities and liability for any registration failure (and for their certification of clients’ 
signatures, as in New Zealand) may improve average quality. However, if this is implemented 
by granting registration powers to conveyancers, it may also lead to an increase in fraud by 
conveyancers, as marginal conveyancers will be undeterred from committing fraud by liability 
concerns. In other words, the strengthening of average quality is compatible with a greater risk 
of very poor quality in a few fraudulent transactions.  
These effects need to be analyzed in the long term, to observe how parties and conveyancers 
learn to game the system, how they behave in periods of financial distress, and how the courts 
and the public react to a possible surge in the number of dispossessed owners or to a series of 
well-publicized scandals. A possible reaction to prominent cases of fraud would be the demise of 
                                                 
8 According to personal communication with the New Zealand registry.    9
Torrens registration, at least in practice, by judicial decisions that erode indefeasibility effects. It 
should be remembered that even though the Ontario online registration system maintained 
registrars’ review, it moved in 2006 from immediate to deferred indefeasibility. In New Zealand, 
some experts advocate formal elimination of indefeasibility (Greenwood and Jones, 2003, pp. 
344-47), which would transform the system from a Torrens registration of rights to a mere 
recording of deeds. In fact, they consider that indefeasibility is already a myth from a practical 
point of view (p. 345). If they are right, it could also be argued that the reform did not worsen the 
functioning of the registry because that functioning was in fact already closer to that of a 
recording of deeds system than a register of rights.
9 Furthermore, checks made after registration 
would, at best, detect fraud after the event, when the results are in theory irrevocable. And 
enhancing the Registrar’s powers of correction for such cases might also dilute indefeasibility.  
In addition, it would be difficult to carry out a cost-benefit analysis of the reforms because of 
substitutions between the conveyancers and the registry. For example, one of the main reasons 
for implementing the electronic system in New Zealand was a desire to avoid delay in 
registration. But lawyers’ compliance duties have substantially increased in cost and time under 
the new system, leading some firms to quit conveyancing practice altogether. Many public 
single-window and one-stop-shop initiatives tend to integrate tasks that private agents perform 
better. The New Zealand reform may have erred in the opposite direction.  
3. Plans in England and Australia 
The original intention of England’s Land Registration Act 2002 was ambitious. Its aim was 
that contracts, transfers and mortgages were to be prepared, signed and completed electronically 
                                                 
9 “From a practical perspective, there is a good case to argue that indefeasibility is a myth…. The 
question needs to be asked whether or not it is time to reward the real victim in the scheme of 
things, that is, the original registered proprietor. Is it not more sensible to offer compensation, 
albeit in limited defined circumstance, to innocent purchasers and mortgagees…?” (Greenwood 
and Jones , 2003, pp. 345-46).    10
and processed by the registry’s systems automatically. This would eliminate the registration gap 
by making registration simultaneous with completion (Land Registry, 2005, p. 17). It was 
planned that “solicitors themselves would make the register entries consequent upon a 
transaction, in dummy form before the transaction is effected and then in final form on 
completion” (Cooke, 2003b, p. 290).  
The registry would however carry out “validation” during the drafting stage, detecting errors 
and inconsistencies and prompting conveyancers to amend documents before execution and 
completion. In this “front end” validation, the registry would check for the absence of conflicts 
between transaction and registered data, making sure, for example, that the seller is the 
registered owner, prompting for necessary changes and creating “notional registers” showing the 
expected result of any particular transaction (Land Registry, 2002, p. 44). After the contract but 
before completion, the electronic transfer and the draft changes to be made to the register would 
thus be approved by the registry (Abbey and Richards, 2002, p. 109). The registry would retain 
full control over changes in the register but the validation process was planned to become 
increasingly automatic. 
It was expected that only a small proportion of applications would require attention by 
registry staff. It was also understood that conditional registration would be necessary for 
problematic cases, in which not all problems can be resolved before completion. Such 
conditional registrations would largely defeat the goal of simultaneous completion and 
registration (Land Registry, 2003, pp. 93-95), but were seen as better than the previous delays. 
Consequent to review by registrars that applications to register are in order (Section 16 of the 
Land Registration Rules 2003), half of the applications for registration generate requisitions in 
the current paper system (Land Registry, 2002, p. 44).    11
Progress towards electronic registration has been slow, however. Developing the technology 
turned out to be much more difficult and costly than expected, and the costs became even harder 
to justify with the dramatic slowdown suffered by the real estate market since 2007.
10  
Moreover, not all conveyancers supported moving out of the paper-based system. A major 
difficulty faced when planning for electronic transfers was having conveyancers sign on behalf 
of their clients. This requires transactors to sign powers of attorney, partly defeating the purpose 
of the reform, as there were doubts about the legality of less formal solutions for representation, 
and they would increase conveyancers’, rightholders’ and acquirers’ risk. In particular, 
conveyancers feared that their clients might later deny that they had given authority to sign, 
further increasing an already risky activity.
11  
More importantly, rightholders may reasonably fear the consequences of fraudulent signing 
and registering of transactions by conveyancers. Given that registered rights enjoy qualified 
indefeasibility,
12 the consequences would be similar to those discussed for the New Zealand 
case: i.e., a greater incidence of fraud would make indefeasibility unsustainable in the long term 
and debase the registry into a mere recording of deeds. 
Consequently, in addition to providing online access to the registered information, the 
electronic services available are in practice limited to electronic discharges, which are directly 
accessible to lenders, so that they can remove legal charges from the land registry subject only to 
                                                 
10 In fact, in 2009 the Land Registry launched an extensive downsizing effort (O’Connor, 2009). 
See also “Land Registry Five Year Transformation Programme” 
(http://www1.landregistry.gov.uk/info/noticeboard/item/?article_id=20323, visited November 8, 
2009).  
11 Conveyancing is already risky for conveyancers. According to the director of the Solicitors’ 
Indemnity Fund, over half the claims against English solicitors, in both number and value, are 
linked to conveyancing practice (Abbey and Richards, 2007, p. 29). 
12 See, e.g., Fox (2005) and Nogueroles (2007, p. 132). O’Connor (2005, pp. 49-52) analyzes 
how registered owners in possession who have not contributed to the “mistake” in registration 
through fraud or carelessness enjoy immediate indefeasibility. Cooke is more cautious about the 
possible interpretations that courts might make with respect to indefeasibility under the 2002 Act 
(2003a, pp. 100 and 122-28).    12
automatic validation. Pilot services also depart from agency registration by requiring the 
electronic signature of rightholders. Both the “Electronic Charge” and the “Business Gateway” 
services require borrowers to sign deeds electronically via the Land Registry system for them to 
be legally valid.
13  
Two common features of these solutions are remarkable: the system requires the electronic 
signature of rightholders, without conveyancers being granted powers to apply for changes to the 
register; and rightholders are allowed to apply but only against their interest: for discharges and 
charges, it is the lender and the borrower signatures which are respectively required.  
Something similar is envisaged for electronic transfers. Initially, these are to be limited to the 
simplest residential transactions: transfers and mortgages of whole, plus discharges of mortgages 
of whole, as anything else seems to be too complex.
14 The key simplifying element is that in all 
these cases registration acts against individual declarations to the registry. The only requirement 
is that the authenticity of such declarations must be checked. But the complexity of modern law 
with its multiplication of rights often makes apparently simple cases more complex than they 
seem. For example, the increasing number and variety of rights granted over the family home to 
spouses who are not owners makes it necessary to collect their consents; otherwise, the 
acquirers’ titles would be burdened with overriding interests.  
Developments in Australia share some features with England. The State of Victoria led 
electronic registration with a system called Electronic Conveyancing Victoria, which was 
theoretically able to handle both registry lodgment and financial settlement. But in 2004 
solicitors almost unanimously rejected the possibility of agency registration because it 
                                                 
13 See Land Registry, “Current E-Services,” http://www1.landregistry.gov.uk/e-
conveyancing/currservice/; and “Pilot E-Services,” http://www1.landregistry.gov.uk/e-
conveyancing/pilot_es/. As to the reasons for this change, see Land Registry, “Report on 
Responses to E-Conveyancing Secondary Legislation Part 2” 
(http://www1.landregistry.gov.uk/assets/library/documents/secondary_legislation.pdf). (All 
websites in this note visited August 23, 2009).  
14 Land Registry, “Our Plans for the Future,” http://www1.landregistry.gov.uk/e-
conveyancing/futureplan/ (visited November 7, 2009).    13
transferred risks to them. In fact, even though the system implemented allows only subscribers 
(mainly, solicitors) to lodge documents which are then reviewed by registrars, the system 
transfers risks to subscribers because they must act as clients’ certifiers. Having cost $40-50 
million, the system registered a single pilot transaction in its 18 first months of operation because 
both banks and conveyancers refused to participate. Banks were not prepared to participate in a 
non-national system, and conveyancers had difficulties in obtaining professional indemnity 
insurance because the risks were considered too high (Fyfe, 2008; Merritt, 2009). Furthermore, 
the system suffered from a weak legal basis, as the registry relied on contracts to regulate the 
licensing of subscribers, lacking proper legislative authority (O’Connor, 2006).  
At one point the Victoria system was considered the model for a national system, the 
Australian National Electronic Conveyancing System (NECS), but this now seems likely to 
develop independently. Agency registration has also been rejected for NECS, so subscribers will 
be able to lodge instruments electronically but registries will check them and then decide 
whether or not to register the lodged instrument. NECS, which also includes automatic transfer 
of funds, also planned that conveyancers would act as “certifiers” of transactors, digitally signing 
documents on behalf of their clients. This raised the typical worries of increasing fraud, mainly 
because it would facilitate both direct fraud by conveyancers and unlawful use of their digital 
signatures by others (Low, 2006, pp. 240-42).  
4. Lessons and possibilities 
These four experiences provide a rich catalog of the possibilities and difficulties of 
developing electronic systems of conveyancing and registration. In particular, they illustrate the 
possibilities for substitution between the tasks performed by humans and computers in different 
titling systems and the tradeoffs involved in these reforms.  
A registry of rights is made up of a registry of deeds (the lodgment or presentation diary) and 
the register of rights stricto sensu, in which only purged, clean titles are entered. Automatic 
lodgment, allowing conveyancers or subscribers to the electronic system to file their application 
without human intervention by registry staff, is relatively easy to accomplish, whatever the type   14
of registry. Conversely, given that the registration decision involves checking that no other 
property rights are affected by the intended transactions, automating such a decision, that is, 
substituting the human registrar by computer software, is much more difficult. It is costly in 
terms of both the effort to develop the system and the additional contractual constraints which 
will be imposed if a stricter numerus clausus is necessary to make the system viable. It is also 
risky in terms of fraud.  
For these reasons, it is easier to fully automate a recording of deeds because it lacks a 
register of rights. Automating it is equivalent to automating the lodgment or presentation book in 
a registry of rights. It is important to keep this in mind in reforms. Otherwise, the introduction of 
electronic registration may inadvertently interfere with the broader decision about the choice of 
titling system, given that registration of rights or its main attribute, indefeasibility, would be 
endangered by granting registration rights to conveyancers. 
This risk is compounded in the case of a registry of rights with genuine deficiencies in terms 
of productivity, delay, registration gaps and, often, poor security. A benefit of agent registration 
is the immediacy of results. However, this benefit may be illusory because it is likely that agency 
registration will debase a registry of rights into a recording of deeds. Granting conveyancers the 
right to directly alter the register should speed up “registration”, but would inevitably reduce the 
legal quality of such rights—properly speaking, rather than speeding up registration it would 
most likely suppress it. This transformation of the title system might be a sensible move in itself 
but, whatever its merits, it should be decided on broader grounds, considering many other 
factors, instead of as an unintentional byproduct of introducing electronic technology. The 
alternative course of action to debasing the system is to tackle the deficiencies of the registry 
head-on. This requires changing the incentives of registrars by linking their compensation to 
performance in terms of both speed and risk.  
These reforms pose other hidden dilemmas in addition to this speed versus legal-quality 
tradeoff. They relate to the standardization of property rights and the partly consequent transfer 
of costs between conveyancers and registries. Reducing the intervention of the registry staff in 
checking transactions for legal compliance and the presence of pertinent consents by affected 
rightholders is easier for standard transactions, which are therefore easier to automate. It is   15
therefore more viable for German-type systems with abstract (non-causal) property transactions 
in which the validity of the transaction is independent of the validity of the causal obligation. But 
there are costs involved in such standardization. Generally, the more abstract and summarized 
the content of the register, the more parties will have to rely on contract documents, which will 
have to be kept by conveyancers and parties. This in itself leads to difficulties. In some solutions, 
there is not even a real simplification but a mere transfer of paperwork, and access to the 
documents may even constrain some transactions. For example, mortgage refinancing may be 
hindered by the need to access documents in the hands of lenders.  
Moreover, in these reforms registries often invest heavily in order to reduce their future 
variable costs and transfer them to conveyancers. These tradeoffs should be carefully examined. 
For instance, savings at the registry are not necessarily good if they are obtained by lowering 
quality or increasing the costs incurred by conveyancers. And both of these effects are likely 
when the chosen option is agency registration, moving the titling system from a registry of rights 
to a registry of deeds. Conveyancers’ costs would increase in two ways: first, because they 
would bear more responsibility for the transaction being filed; second, because they would need 
to search the title by examining the chain of deeds for the parcel.  
Understandably, there would be a parallel transfer of risk and liability between registries and 
conveyancers. This would tend to pose additional constraints on the structure of the 
conveyancing market. In general, conveyancers’ ability to ensure compliance in the aspects not 
verified by a registry depends on their incentives, which are mainly defined not only by their 
position vis-à-vis their clients and third parties (e.g., their independence with respect to large 
parties) and their effective liability regime but also by the intensity of competition among 
conveyancers. This suggests a tradeoff between competition in conveyancing and conveyancers’ 
ability to check transactions for compliance: the greater the competition, the lesser the ability of 
conveyancers to preserve the interests of third parties. A similar argument works for 
conveyancers’ fraud. It is intrinsic to competition that some professional firms are brought close 
to bankruptcy. This greatly modifies their incentives to lower standards in aspects that are not 
rewarding to clients, and even leads them, in some cases,  to commit fraud. When these effects 
are observed, a logical reaction is to reinforce rules and reduce competition. Thus, the price of 
greater functions, especially those related to externalities, ends up being reduced competition.    16
5. Empowering rightholders  
Reforms in this area tend to disregard the possibilities created by new technologies to ensure 
more effective rightholders’ consents, avoiding fraud and, in particular, overcoming an essential 
weakness in all systems with registration of rights: the risk that owners may lose their property 
right without having granted their consent. This can now be achieved in at least in three 
complementary ways: dispensing with conveyancers and enhancing security through codes and 
notices.  
5.1.  Dispensing with conveyancers 
In all sectors, the role played in the productive chain by different types of intermediaries, 
such as distributors or banks, has been decreasing, as new technologies allow manufacturers and 
lenders to interact more directly with customers or borrowers. This “disintermediation” process 
is also active in conveyancing, as new technologies allow parties to interact more directly among 
themselves and with the registry (Arruñada, 2007). Digital signatures provide a way of 
authenticating the will of the parties that can be used to complement or substitute the 
authenticating function of conveyancers and witnesses. The identification task passes to the 
certifying authority, which has to check individuals’ identity when first issuing signatures to 
them. This makes it possible for rightholders to communicate directly with the registry to 
formalize their consent to the intended transaction. Digital signatures save time and money 
because they allow individuals to physically interact just once with the authenticator, the digital 
signature’s certification authority, for all transactions during the life of the identity certificate, 
instead of once for each transaction. Furthermore, rightholders’ consent can be safely gathered 
without any need for the rightholder to be present at the closing. In fact, there is no need for a 
physical closing act. Digital signatures may also be safer than traditional methods, especially 
now that conveyancers do not personally know most of the transacting parties, as they used to do 
in the past, and have to rely on indirect proof such as identity cards which are easily 
manipulated. A UN committee concluded that “electronic signatures can be used to authenticate 
deeds. When they are used there must be certainty of authorship, guarantees that there has been   17
no change in transit, the signatures cannot be repudiated, and the data remain confidential” (UN-
ECE, 2005, p. 15). Moreover, digital signatures are compatible with all sorts of conveyancers’ 
intervention, which could be either superseded or complemented in a general way or on an 
optional basis, for all or some types or transactions or parties. For instance, it seems particularly 
easy for banks to communicate cancellations of mortgages directly to the registry in this way. 
Digital signatures also have the potential for facilitating do-it-yourself (DIY) conveyancing, at 
least for the most routine and standardized transactions. 
5.2.  Enhancing security with codes 
A modest way to improve security is to provide rightholders with digital identifier codes 
(right- and person-specific), known only to the holder and the registry, that they must assign to 
their conveyancing representatives in order to allow representation or must produce in some 
other form before registration (Thomas, 2003b and 2003c). This would provide a safer version of 
the paper certificates of titles used in Torrens registries, which have been eliminated in reforms 
such as that of New Zealand. Its workings are similar to the “two key” system used for electronic 
transactions in financial securities, in which both the owner and the broker must provide their 
unique identifier codes before a transaction takes place (Thomas and Grinlinton, 2005). 
Moreover, two- or three-key systems tie in perfectly with the theory of property titling 
(Arruñada, 2003), as they ensure that no property right is affected without its rightholder giving 
consent to a specific conveyancer or, more directly, to the transaction itself.  
5.3.  Enhancing security with electronic notices 
Similarly, electronic technology reduces the cost of policies requiring the registry to notify 
affected rightholders of any change in the status of their rights before or even after registration 
becomes effective, something that could be implemented as a parallel safeguard in most systems. 
The value of this notification is clearly shown by the emergence of private providers of this type 
of information in countries where registration fraud has become a serious worry, even if in this   18
case it takes place after registration. For instance, in Costa Rica, since 2007 a private firm called 
PPR daily checks a mirror database of the public register to identify transactions which have 
been registered in the last 24 hours and if any have not been authorized automatically files a 
caveat.
15 At the least, registries should be allowed to notify registered rightholders about 
intended changes in their registered rights, as covered by Section 23 of the Ontario Land 
Registration Reform Act after its 2006 amendment. It is worth mentioning in this regard that the 
English Land Registry has traditionally notified rightholders about intended changes to the 
register when the Registry perceives a possibility of fraud or undue influence. Moreover, 
notification is becoming standard security in all types of computerized registries. For example, 
the fraud alert systems introduced by section 112 of the 2003 US Fair and Accurate Credit 
Transactions Act (FACTA) allow consumers to instruct credit reporting bureaus to notify users 
that the consumer is or might be a victim of identity fraud. Users of consumer reports are then 
restricted in the type of credit they can extend to that consumer. Some credit bureaus also 
provide consumers with a monitoring service that alerts them whenever someone asks about their 
credit (Zetter, 2009). Working on a similar basis is the security trick used by some websites that 
send an email to all new registrants requiring them to validate their registration before they can 
start interacting with the website. These are just three examples of the possibilities that new 
technologies have opened up for protecting individuals and developing customized protection 
schemes. 
Reasons of expediency, security and cost which are often given against empowering 
rightholders when introducing electronic systems do not hold much water. Empowering 
rightholders does add a complication and would take additional time and money to implement. 
Furthermore, many citizens do not yet use information technology. But registration systems are 
not developed for the short term and should be designed on the understanding that in the near 
future most, if not all, citizens will use digital signatures. Furthermore, the issuance of electronic 
signatures linked to the renewal of identity cards, which is well advanced in many countries, 
                                                 
15 See “¿Qué haría si un día se da cuenta de que su casa, lote o finca ya no le pertenece?,” 
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would avoid most of these difficulties, whatever their other merits. Digital signatures will 
increasingly be seen as a type of contractual infrastructure similar in nature and importance to 
the civil registry.  
To avoid the greater possibilities for fraud created by electronic conveyancing, some analysts 
have also called for restricting access to registered professionals and having them certify the 
identity and authority of parties (e.g., Christensen, 2004). Both aspects are questionable, as they 
reduce competition and impede disintermediation. Moreover, their effect on security is doubtful, 
as they facilitate two forms of fraud: identity fraud by third parties, especially when rightholders 
are not required to sign, and direct fraud by conveyancers who may abuse their certification 
powers (Low, 2006).  
Lastly, empowering rightholders is also costly, but costs differ substantially with the type of 
empowerment and, more importantly, there is scope for empowering rightholders in a self-
sustained way, as they could be given the choice of, for instance, paying a fee to subscribe to a 
notice service from the registry. In systems of agency registration like New Zealand’s, they 
could also be allowed to choose whether a registration application should include their digital 
signature before it can be registered, and/or to request that transactions affecting their rights be 
subject to manual examination by the registrar. These options could be offered on a fee-for-
service basis, reducing their cost and maximizing their value.  
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